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Article 7

Book Reviews
The Imagery of John Donne's Sermons by Winfried Schleiner. Providence:
Brown University Press, 1970. Pp. x + 254. $7.50.
In this study Mr. Schleiner seeks to answer the question" What are the central
causes of the images Donne uses in his sermons?" As he makes quite clear, for
him it is the image's final cause, its uses in illuminating its tenor, that determine
its choice, along with two other principles of selectivity: the image's place in a
traditional body of topoi derived from Biblical and Patristic sources, and its
conforming to an accepted decorum of "high" and "low" terms ranged on the
H chain of being" treated as a hierarchy of value.
In contrast to other methods
for carrying out image studies (including Milton Rugoff's Donne's Imagery),
where the emphasis is thrown on the images themselves as generated either out
of the author's psychological set of mind or his day-to-day experience, Schleiner
insists that images can only be grasped adequately when their tenors are included
as part of their total make-up. This insistence leads Schleiner to look for the
images' sources in neither Donne's personality nor the concerns of his daily life,
but rather in the common repositories for metaphors where the specific conjunctions of vehicles and tenors to be found in Donne had been for centuries available to all preachers: The Bible, St. Augustine and the many scriptural exegetes
from his time to Calvin's.
The book is divided into three main sections. The first argues that the various
artes concionandi available to preachers in the Renaissance, though it is not clear
which of them, if any, Donne was familiar with, set forth a decorum for matching
images with' their tenors according to a hierarchy on which various items were
arranged according to their intrinsic worth. At its most orthodox this decorum
required that" the things that must be compared to something bad are generally
of a base degree or quality, which are likened completely or in part. Such are
filth, poison, viper, venom, captivity, ulcer, slime, snake, etc. To signify an
honest man, the things to which one may compare his life in part are generally
of a high nature. Such are the sun, firmament, prince, and others which indicate
something good completely or in part" (Didacus Stella, De ratione concionandi,
sive rhetorica ecclesiastica). Available within such a hierarchical norm of decorum
are also the possibilities for both meiosis and amplificatio, for dispraising or
heightening the subject matter. For instance, Donne's comparison of fallen man
to a wolf, a viper, a spider, to slime and excrement, and his reduction of him
(following the Psalms) to something <I worse than a worm," and finally to "that
Nothing, than the which what can be imagined more vacant and vile? " presupposes such a hierarchy in which man's sinfulness makes it " decorous" to compare
him only with the lowest things. At the other end of the scale, amplification
becomes a means of speaking of God, where such Biblical connections between
vehicle and tenor allow Donne to speak of God as the Sun and as a King, with
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the rhetorical intention of expressing chiefly the fact It that the Divine is beyond
human motivation" (p. 49).
The main sources of these images and of their particular tenors are discussed
in the second and third sections, where Schleiner is particularly concerned with
demonstrating that the various nexes between vehicle and tenor found in Donne's
sermons all belong to "fields of imagery" already long traditional by the 17th
century. A field of imagery occurs when there is a conjunction between an
image and its meaning which allows a wide variety of correspondence between
the various accidents, adjuncts, purposes, and so on through the various lists of
loci or tapoi available to the Renaissance writer. Schleiner finds that classification
of images either by the vehicles or by their tenors alone will distort their place
in Donne's work, because such separation ignores the fact that within Donne's
rhetorical practice both vehicle and tenor were chosen "together," as it were.
Re is critical of students of Donne's imagery who see it as a photographic negative,
rendering a congeries of perceptions and psychological reflexes. As Schleiner says
after investigating a particularly fertile field of imagery, "Sin as Siclmess,"
In drawing psychological conclusions one must distinguish between figurative and nonfigurative discourse. The mere presence of such words as
anatomy, antidote, dissect, fever, gangrene, p/:Jysick, plaster, and purge,
and other medical imagery does not justify the conclusion that Donne
took a special interest in medicine as a science. I have tried to show that
in the field of imagery in which sin is seen as sickness, words like gangrene,
plaster, fever, have their figurative predecessors in Augustine's putria,
emplastrum, febris (p. 81).
Other fields of imagery that Schleiner investigates include "Life as a Journey,"
"The Book of the World," "The Seal of the Sacrament," "Salvation as a Purchase," and "The Eyes of the Soul." All of these fields make themselves felt
through "scattered tropes that [are] identified as explicating some central
analogy." Schlciner treats" such structures ... [as] of the nature of a paradigm:
the bare structures exist, although they are not overtly present as such anywhere
in the spoken sermon or on the printed page" (p. 159). In these fields the principles of decorum dealt with in the previous section are supposedly operative,
although the author makes no attempt to apply them here overtly.
However, in the last section, which deals with images derived from traditional
,-Biblical exegesis, Schleiner is specifically concerned with metaphorical junctures
which seem quite definitely to violate the hierarchical principle of decorum,
and are therefore in need of further explanation. As he says, "certain semantic
theories that were the basis of conventional biblical exegesis supplied a pattern
for what otherwise often appears only abstruse, overingenious, or shrewd"
(p. 164). The fourfold levels of Biblical interpretation practiced throughout the
Middle Ages distinguished first between the vox of the text itself and the res
which the text referred to. The res in turn was nothing less than the whole of
creation and the witnesses to God's hand in history which the Bible recorded.
Therefore res themselves were inherently symbolic: as one exegete whom Schleiner
quotes says: "For as many properties as thing has, so many tongues does it
have, which enunciate something spiritual and invisible,_and through the diversity
of which the meaning of the same word is varied" (Peter of Poiters; p. 171).
Schleiner shows that Donne often drew images from the Bible and gave them
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tenors associated with them in traditional Biblical exegesis; that, while not going
as far as the literalism of Calvin, Donne distrusted some of the more ingenious
interpretations he had access to; that he overtly introduced the terms of the
fourfold levels both in the divisions of his sermons and in the bodies of them
as well; and that he occasionally took time to argue before his auditory with his
various exegetical sources. Far from being simply a function of the plastic
imagination, Donne's images were carefully and consciously drawn from a Biblical
source, which meant that the relation between vehicle and tenor was not so much
created by the preacher as rather created by the Creator and discovered by the
exegete.
Schleiner has performed a service for Donne's sermons similar to that performed
by Rosemond Tuve for Renaissance poetry at large. No longer, we would hope,
will critics" explain" Donne's images as Don Cameron Allen did in a passage
quoted by Schleiner, comparing medical images in Donne and Herbert: '" Syrup
of rhubarb is the favorite of Donne, whereas Herbert likes the more gentle
effects of a distillation of white and damask roses' for which contrast the explanation is given that' Donne being of a more explosive temperament advocates the
use of more potent herbs than Herbert.''' On this Schleiner remarks dryly: "As
far as I know Donne did not advocate the use of any herbs in his writings,
though he sometimes referred to them by way of analogy" (p. 81). For the
sources of this analogy and others like it, Schleiner cites the Psalms, Jeremiah,
St. Augustine, Robert Cawdrey's A Treasurie or Store-House of Similies, St. Paul
and, of course, Christ himself. Such citations are typical of the thoroughness with
which the sources of Donne's images are searched out and compared.
To the question, then, which I posed at the beginning as the one implicidy
underlying the answers which make up Schleiner's book, I would have to say he
gives full and convincing answers. I would have, however, to make a further
distinction between the book's method and its methodology. A literary method is
a technique for answering certain critical questions; a methodology, for lack
of a better term, is the acquired wisdom of knowing what are important questions
to ask As an illustration of the method of image study, I think Schleiner's study
succeeds 'admirably. But I find also that the study'S methodical success marks
also its essential methodological failure. On this second level one might well
ask" Is the question this book asks one which will lead to a larger understanding
of Donne's sermons? " and the answer to this question must be that it does not.
Other image studies, including the more naive studies by Caroline Spurgeon
and RugofI, or the more sophisticated studies of G. W. Knight and Wolfgang
Clemen, make the essential methodological assumption that image studies do in
fact yield significant statements about certain texts, because it is likewise assumed
that" diction" (out of Aristotle's six parts of a verbal mimesis) gives the radical
representative anecdote for a piece's whole verbal action and meaning. Even
granting that any piece of criticism has to start somewhere and cannot hope to
take into itself all 'Possible considerations, or perhaps because of this fact, a
critic needs to examine his own methodological presuppositions about what do
or do not constitute significant questions about literature at large, or at least about
the text he is confronting. On this score the question which this study answers
fails of prime relevancy on two counts: the study implicidy conceives the meaningful context of the images it works with to be neither the individual sermon
nor even the whole corpus of Donne's sermons as specifically such, but rather
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all the other occurrences of these images in the whole of Christian discourse up In
to Donne's time. This commits a mistake typical of historical criticism, namely, ~u
making the significance of a work totally a function of its external relations and 'le
sources. Secondly, the study fails in that it implicitly treats Donne's sermons, th
and overtly the imagery in them, as if both derived from motives and embodied I
rhetorical intentions no different from those of any other literary work, the end
of which would be to move the beholder aesthetically only.
1,
On the first point, Schleiner's intention has been overtly to assemble image
patterns repeated with variations through Donne's sermons, and to exhibit these (
repetitions as primarily a function of Donne's indebtedness to traditional sources. y:
Now, what exactly has been said through this? For one thing, the author's
purpose shares nothing \vith those of other critics who are bent on demonstrating
some sort of psychologically based pattern running through Donne's writing, for I(
Schleiner overtly eschews this approach. On the other hand, he is not concerned .~C,:
with the functional approach to imagery, which sees it as the radical representative
anecdote of the ,vork's meaning, because this viewpoint necessarily commits the
critic to examining works as total wholes, internally organized and susceptible
to organismic criticism. Schleiner does not follow this approach to Donne's
sermons either, for he never takes up the question of a given image's function
within its specific context. TIlUS we have here an image study without either
of the methodological underpinnings which have in the past been advanced,
however inadequate they might have been, for making image studies in the first
place. VVhat we have in fact is a contribution to the history of traditional
Christian topoi, much in the manner of Curtius' European Literature and the Latin
Middle Ages (to which Schleiner is openly indebted), an approach which, however valid and useful it may be in the history of ideas or culture, is necessarily
committed to ignoring what constitutes the marks of a work's specificity and
autonomy, to making a literary work's significance-and by implication, its
meaning-entirely a function of what it shares with the total context of common
topoi to which it is seen as itself a contributor. From this viewpoint, Schleiner's
study told me very little about Donne's sennons, however much it illuminated
some of the ways Donne went about writing them. l\1ethodologically, such an
approach generates questions which implicitly ignore the fact of the sermons'
specificity, and which sacrifice this to a larger historical entity called "the
Christian exegetical tradition." As such, tIns study really constitutes a contribution
"to what Cassirer calls the study of "symbolic forms."
On the second point, this study's implicit treatment of Donne's sermons as
differing in no way from any other oration in its means of persuasion, Schleiner
makes an interesting admission late in the book:
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It must be said, however, that answers to the questions of how Donne
thought about allegorical readings of Scripture, what he understood by
the various senses of Scripture, and what his stand was concerning certain
controverted interpretation-interesting as such problems may be-are
of only very limited help when one comes to examine Donne's tropes.
The rhetorical level has its own validity, . . . Whether beyond that [a
COnCelTI with the ways Biblical exegesis provided Donne with metaphors],
a metaphor based on biblical allegory had the special "truth value" for
Donne that it had for the medieval exegetes is a different question,
which I intend to discuss only in passing (p. 164).
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In other words, along with ignoring the imagery's place within the totality of
a given sermon, Schleiner's approach likewise ignores the specific rhetorical
function of this imagery insofar as tlus is determined by the ends peculiar to the
sermon itself as a genre in its own right, or for that matter, as Donne understood
this genre. Though he occasionally throws a glance in the direction of the
specific audience for Donne's sermons, for the most part Schleiner assumes that
Donne conceived the imagery he drew from the Bible as working on his auditory
in a manner no different from that drawn from any other source. Though he
shows himself familiar with the work of Dennis Quinn on Donne's sermons,
particularly an important article on Donne's indebtedness to the Bible (ELH,
1960), he seems for one reason or another to have ignored the essential point
which Quinn makes. As Quinn shows, Donne derived his understanding of
God's "Word" from St. Augustine, from whose De doctrina Ch1'isticma Donne
came to understand that what" persuades" and converts the auditory is not the
preacher's eloquence, but rather the preacher's using and expounding the eloquence of the Holy Spirit itself as found in the scriptures. As Quinn says there,
"The psychology of preaching in general is, for Donne, the same as the psychology of the Bible, which worhs directly upon the soul and only indirectly
upon men's reason." "The preacher cooperates in the sacramental application of
Christ's merits to men's souls by imitating the divine process visible in the Scriptures." "The eloquence of the Holy Ghost actualized the Word of God, and the
preacher reactualizes the text by applying it to the immediate needs of the
hearers. The meaning of the Holy Ghost is, thus, made flesh in the Bible and
in preaching" (pp. 283, 284, 285). Schleiner certainly shows himself aware of
the fact that for the biblical exegetes and for Donne as well, the res which the
scripture's word refers to has a spiritual significance which the preacher discovers
rather than creates: "[Donne] draws his analogies from the natural world less
in order to explain the divine than to infer by his carefully worked out paradoxes
the supernatural quality of the event" (p. 183). The implications of Schleiner's
approach would seem to be simply that Donne went back to scripture as a somehow conventional, "appropriate" source of imagery, just as a humanist poet felt
himself duty-bound to return to Horace and Virgil for appropriate tropes and
topoi. On the contrary, Donne's indebtedness to traditional Christian topoi,
which Schleiner discovers and exhibits with such care, nevertheless came about
for reasons which the author shows himself for the most part unaware of. Biblical
topoi were for Donne unlike any others, because they were the manifestation of
the hand of Providence, and therefore claimed absolute priority for a preacher
wishing to move an auditory of the faithful: for a sermon of the Word of God
persuaded not through the preacher, but through that Word itself.
A definitive, or for that matter even an adequate study of Donne's sermons has
yet to appear. Nevertheless, within the limits I have suggested, this book should
make an important contribution to the ongoing scholarship on the sermons;
and if it cannot pretend to be the last word on the sermons, it at least shows
us much of how the writer of those sermons went about composing them.
MICHAEL McCANLES

A1arquette University

..

350

BOOK REVIEWS

Art and Pornography by Morse Peckham. New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp.
viii + 306. $6.95.
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One cannot read Morse Peckham's Art and Pornography without recalling the
old joke involving the dialogue between an instructor and his student in the high
school gym class. The two had reached an impasse while debating the number
of possible positions in sexual intercourse. The besieged instructor had proclaimed
that there were a maximum of ninety-two positions while the insurgent student
insisted upon the possibility of ninety-three permutations, when a second student
Olrged them to settle their dispute by orally itemizing their respective lists. The
student commenced his list by saying, "Well, first there is the one with the
man on top and the woman below, facing him heart to heart." The instructor
sheepishly apologized to the class, correcting himself by admitting, "I guess
there must be ninety-three positions after all." As is true of so many instructors,
one has the suspicion that Professor Peckham has left out an important" position"
while attempting to secure his own by chastizing those who would theorize less
and experiment more.
But, like the defeated gym teacher, Professor Peckham probably went astray
long ago, and in attempting to repair the damage, substituted omission for comission. It's a common error in sexual encounters. In Man's Rage for Chaos he
defined art as the consequence of a particular mode of behavior which, being
conventionalized and socially validated, could best be schematized as a social role.
The artist's role then was simply defined as that of producing works (as opposed
to "play"?) to serve as the occasion for adapting the art perceiver's role. For
Morse Peckham every artist must alternate his own role with the perceiver's role
in order" to judge whether or not he is fulfilling his function." Never mind that
most artists think of function only in highly self-conscious terms and ignore the
fact that some of the best art of this century has been produced by those whose
role as a potential" art perceiver" waS physically or emotionally impaired. Monet's
near-blindness seriously impeded his role as a perceiver of those splendid water
lillies and Duchamp's decision to cease painting and yet have the act thought
of as art, by some even the beginning of "minimal" art, in effect involved him
in the willed self-surrender of his role as a potential perceiver. Nevertheless,
given a work of art that offers considerable perceptual discontinuity, Peckham
argues that repeated exposure to that work results in a steadily decreasing perceptual discontinuity since the perceiver will eventually build up a perceptual
model, the expectancies of which will correspond to the particular work Such
a work of art then no longer offers perceptual discontinuity, hence new works
must be created propelling man toward aesthetic chaos. Man's Rage for Chaos
then envisioned a sort of adaptability theory working in modern art; in order to
prevent art from wearing out, we invent a "nonfunctional stylistic dynamism."
The proliferating democracy of form is sufficient evidence that art is wearing out:
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... if a series of artifacts of the same functional (or semantic) aspect
are arranged in chronological order and exhibit stylistic changes that are
independent of their function, then each member of that series functioned
as a work of art.
(Art and Pornography, p. 79)
Surely, art wears out only for tired eyes. And what Professor Peckham has
done is to counter aesthetic fatigue by proposing a banal, if not antiquated, notion
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about the conservation of aesthetic energy in the perceiver-a kind of seIfadjusting murine mechanism that is but the masquerade for an application of
phony nineteenth century science to modern art. The most vulnerable feature of
Freud's dynamics is thus taken over completely and applied to a reahn where it
has considerably less relevance. But the dangers are familiar ones; Peckham's
"nonfunctional stylistic dynamism" in effect severs form from content and
makes style an added ingredient. Of course, perceptual discontinuity is a logical
paradox since it is both the cause and effect of a widening of the breach between
function and style. Yet the history of art might suggest the opposite-notably,
that where medium and message come ever closer together, the radical discontinuity exists only in Professor Peckham's mind. After all, Andy Warhohl's soup
cans are about as "condensed" as the undisguised object itself. Even more
importantly, the discoverer of nonfunctional dynamism attempts to explore the
artistic consciousness from the "outside," and critic's vantage point, rather than
the interior consciousness of the craftsman, then excuses it by saying that every
artist responds initially as a critic anyway. In addition to its presumption, the
argument inevitably confuses the critic's chronology, the history of art, with
the artist's chronology, made up of his own career and the urge to personal
development. Add to these two diverse time schemes, the self-conscious primitivism of much modern art which seeks to return to the medium's beginnings (drip
painting, earthworks-as-undisguised-Iandscape, environments, etc.) and one can
easily understand the confusion that ensues whenever the author discusses the
temporality of art. Fortunately, it is the confusion of the critic rather than the
artist.
Such comprises the premise from which Professor Peckham's Art and Pornography derives. It is a theory which sees the human race moving toward ever
higher levels of discontinuity in an effort at rene"\ving aesthetic adaptation to a
hostile environment. Pornography is part of an aesthetic demilitarized zone where
society's rage to order and control and the individual's rage for innovation are
temporarily suspended within a gentleman's agreement that allows both repression
and experiment. Like so many buffer zones, the boundaries of pornographic art
are drawn with sufficient looseness so that each party can claim a partial victory
while simultaneously recognizing the nature of the aesthetic conspiracy. George P.
Elliott made a similar case in his essay, " Against Pornography," published several
years ago, and freighted it with considerably less non-cognitive cargo. Just as
Morse Peckham finds a great deal of modern art to be more confusing than either
aesthetica31y or sociologically functional, so he finds considerable uncertainty and
confusion at what he calls the "theoretical-explanatory" end of the semiotic
spectrum. In more simple terms, he sees the increase in interest in pornography
as a response to a culture that has totally relativized sexual experience, where
there are no longer any answers. This heightens the tendency to move toward
the immediate "end." Hence one powerful appeal of pornography; it consists
mainly of exemplary verbal mediating signs and visual mediating signs. The
greater the confusion, uncertainty, and logical conflict at the theoreticalexplanatory level, the less limiting the selection at the immediate goal of the
semiotic spectrum. It follows that pornography offers a way of gratifying the
interest in mediating signs for those unable to gratify it in immediate signs. The
virtual if not the real appeal of pornography is in its offer of relief from the
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cognitive strain of genital selection inadequately supported by a clear, unequivocal,· "'xt!
and conflict-free theory of sexual behavior. Again, Professor Peckham's vocabu- ~
lary gives all away. Phrases like" conflict generation," "adaptational aggression,"
and "relief" reveal just how much Art and Pornography is dependent upon the
C
shabby foundation of over-simplified Freudian dynamics. Pornography is invari- be
ably an oudet, a healthy substitute for blockage at the hands of a hostile culture. ~to
The bias of such a system, of course, lies in its normative presumptions; por- n:,
nography is "useful" because it educates us into an adaptive socia-sexual role.
The price that Professor Peckham pays for such a system is very high indeed.
Invariably it places pornography within an adolescent framework and its artistic [~
manifestation within the category of a self-adjusting apprenticeship. Surely H
Picasso and Nabokov have a prolonged adolescence!
,0
In the last chapter entit1e~ "Pornography and Culture" the author recognizes
that the privacy of sexual behavior permits and encourages the presence of nongenital factors which are explained by the notion of role interests. This notion
is justified by the presence of the same factors not only in the general perfonnance
of sexual roles but also in non-sexual roles. Although admitting that actual
genital performance is a responsible (to whom?) activity insofar as it demands
interaction with the environment, pornography is seen to be irresponsible because
it permits the presentation in mediating signs of any selection of the full range
of interests at work in any sexual role. The interests are those of adaptation
(through tension discharge and reduction) and the more nebulous concerns of
the culture itself. Although Morse Peckham never precisely defines those cultural
concerns, he does see pornography as providing "cultural insights." De Sade,
for example, diluted the Enlightenment notion that man yearns for harmony with
nature and other men by conclusively demonstrating that man really longs for
mastery and the suffering of others.
Actually, Peckham's argument is it). itself obscene and that very feature may
redeem it by giving his theories a certain tangential relationship to pornography.
At one point, he asserts that the interests of pornography are always sexual and
that may well be his first error. Genital in the sense that the form tends to
reduce people to members or receptacles, pornography is dehumanizing in' a way
appropriate to the myths of modern science. The repetition of random events
with such frequency as to be subject to prediction; sensual bombardment; experi~
mentation; and the anatomy of ":fields" of experience which can be joined and
exited at will all make pornography appear part of modern scientific consciousness. A universe where originality is limited, where matter can be neither created
nor destroyed, is a universe of substitution, fatigue, and the rearrangement of
particles. Unlike most forms of human consciousness, which have more or less
clearly defined beginnings and endings, pornographic art, insofar as it is a very
enacting genre, always confuses fantasy and communication and, one suspects,
plays a fictional fugue upon real connections. In so many pornographic novels,
one is never sure where novel begins and where the apparatus leaves off. The
technique is remarkably similar to the reader's experience of pornographic art;
the aisles of drugstore bookshelves are filled with readers who never begin on
the novel's first pages, but always begin in the middle thumbing through it more
or less at random, creating their own beginnings and endings and prey only
to the limitations of boredom. Such a compatibility between the reader's experi-
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ence of pornography and the author's self-conscious technique would suggest the
extent to which pornographic art is a very sophisticated participatory art form.

Not only is there present plot reduction, but also character reduction. We
seldom remember· the names of characters in pornographic fiction precisely because
they have lost their subjectivity, have had it reduced, often quite literally, to a
Story of o. This feature surely qualifies pornographic art as part of the ""Perience of liberation. That which is private parts or private property must be made

communal if the spatial dimension of the fictional form is to approximate the
spatial physics of the sex act. Perhaps· this accoutits for the widespread use
of "letters, notebooks, and private memoirs by the authors of erotica. Hence the
question of delayed access is inextricably bound up with the forms of pornography: the access to the opposite sex; the writer's access to that which would
normally be private; and the reader's access to purchase the material without
legal hindrance. But total access deindividuates so that not only the characters,
but recendy even the authors, remain anonymous; in the activity of both there
1S a proliferation of the mask as psychic .equipment.
Rather than viewing pornography in the Freudian terms of Professor Peckham's
scheme, could we not use more current psychoanalytical theOry? If my suspicion

that pornography is a kind of paradigm of modem civilization where private
spaces are turIi.ed ·into public places is accurate, then could we not say that it
is a highly defensive mode. When women have been turned into screwing
machines with the total loss of identity, then the male cannot be rejected except
in the way in which machines reject. And machines cast out deformed productsan analogy which may well account for the abundance of grotesques in pornographic art. Nowhere does Peckham talk about the relationship between prison
literature and pornography and the nature of the voyeurism involved when one
has lost his authenticity of being. Like so many of the technological II environments" of modern art, the prison is completely introverted ;1nd yet without
privacy. Clearly, the Victorian era saw the heightened interest in both forms.
As the mythology that all society is repressive and ultimately incarcerating ariseS,
all of us are born into a condition of imprisonment, and the frequency of the
pornographic experience may well be a direct function of the paradoxes of our

freedom, emblamized in the gaze of the voyeur voluptuary who indicts himself
in the act of making fictions.
JAN

B.

GORDON

. State University of New York
at Buffalo
Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition by Thomas McFarland. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1969. Pp. xl + 394. $9.95.
Professor Mcfarland has written an immensely learned study of an enormously

difficult subject. Coleridge himself is difficult enough, but add the problem of his
relationship to the pantheist tradition and the difficulty becomes awesome.

At first glance, it seems odd that McFarland begins with a fifty-two page
chapter on the much-vexed problem of plagiarism in Coleridge. This would
seem rather to be matter for footnotes in such a study as this. But it soon becomes
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clear that McFarland !mows what he is about. The discussion of this seeminglY' !
pedestrian problem becomes a way of entry into Coleridge'S philosophical method· , ,
ology, and McFarland concludes: "we are faced not with plagiarism, but with
nothing less than a mode of composition-composition by mosaic organization
rather than by painting on an empty canvas" (p. 27). As McFarland summarize,
earlier in his excellent chapter-length Introduction· on "Coleridge and Philosophical Originality," "a great philosopher's originality lies not in tenninology, but
rather in viewpoint and tone, and, above all, in the organic· quality of his position.
His historical importance doubdess depends upon factors of race, moment, and

milieu, but his intrinsic quality, that which distinguishes him from other thinkers
of similar persuasion, is almost wholly dependent upon the character of his work
as an organism" (p. xxxi).. McFarland is concerned then with the influence of
Spinoz3, the Neo-Platonic tradition, Jakob Boehme, and the like, on Coleridge,
but he never loses sight of the fact that Coleridge was his own man, that the
ideas of the II pantheist tradition" are often given Dew meaning in the .fresh
context of the Coleridgean mosaic. The plagiarism problem is perhaps not
completely resolved-there remain certain" borrC?wings" which seem inexplicable
even under McFarland's hypothesis-but it is placed in a perspective which
seems generally convincing and illuminating.
McFarland's grasp of the pantheist tradition, be it said, is broad and firm. His
documentation of that tradition'"'-not only in footnotes, but also in fifty pages
of endnotes and seventy-six pages of "excursus notes "-will be of great value to
Coleridge scholars.
A caveat, however. For all the good grasp of the philosophers traditionally
seen as "pantheist," it might be asked whether there are no~ occasional oversimplifications of matters which are still moot. It is not at all clear to all Plotinus
scholars that Plotinns was a pantheist (pp.122, 144, et passim); nor is the easy
equation betWeen "mysticism" and pantheism acceptable to all students of the
history of religious thought (p. 130 and note); nor is it innnediately evident that
"pantheism is inescapably inherent in the monism of the Unitarian denial of
the Trinity" (p. 177). And the caveat occasionally extends to McFarland's
reading of Coleridge as well. It seems to me all too facile simply to read pantheism
in "Religious Musings," in such lines as "There is one Mind, one omnipresent
Mind, / Omnific" (pp. 172-173), especially in view of Coleridge's later. comment
(which McFarland quotes to another purpose on the following page) that his
reference to the Deity in that poem as U the sale Operant" may II easily be
misconstrUed into Spinosism" (my emphasis). Granted the possibility of the
alterations of hindsight, Coleridge's own protestations to the contrary should not
be left too much out of account.
All the same, it is true enough that Coleridge struggled through much of hi'
early and middle life against the blandishments of pantheism, and McFarland"
focusing of the struggle is generally clear and useful.
It is in his last chapter, on U The Trinitarian Resolution" ~f the problem of
pantheism, that the focus goes awry. It is true enough that Coleridge's acceptance
of Trinitarian doctrine was the resolution of the pantheist dilemma, ultimately
the problem of the "One and the Many." By now, however, the II One and the
Many" on which McFarland has come to focus is not the relationship between
God and creatures (which was actually Coleridge'S basic problem vis..a"lJis
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pantheism)! but on the "One and the Many 11 within the Godhead. Hence the
discussion of the" resolution" of the Trinitarian problem itself (distinction of
the three Persons of the Trinity) is not enough. Coleridge went beyond, but
McFarland does not seem to see his way clearly enough to follow. At this point,
two crucial elements in Coleridge's thought are left out of account. Coleridge
did come to a reasonably satisfactory resolution of the problem, but in terms of
principles which McFarland does not enunciate.
First, there is Coleridge's notion of the "consubstantiality" of all being, much
akin to the traditional notion of the" analogy of being "-which allows him to
speak of God and creatures analogously, not umvocally. This is closely tied in
with Coleridge's conception of symbol, which in turn demands close consideration
of the faculty of imagination. Imagination is discussed cursorily by McFarland,
symbol not at all; in particular, there is no reference to Coleridge's important
discussion of symbol in Appendix B of the Stateman's Manual. Yet, it seems to me,
here is the heart of Coleridge's response to the problem of the One and the Many,
and hence of his escape from pantheism.
Secondly, the pantheist problem in Coleridge cannot be resolved without a
consideration of his views on the Logos (Alterity) not only within the Godhead
but as the pattern of all Creation. It is crucially important in Coleridge'S approach
to the problem of the One and the Many that Creation had a beginning. God
is "I Am" from all eternity; the created world of the Many was not, but now
is-and its pattern is the Logos.
Without these two keys-the consubstantiality of all being (with its concomitants
of symbol and imagination) and the Logos as the pattern of Creation-any
resolution of pantheism in Coleridge's thought is impossible.
It is fairly clear why McFarland has failed at this point. Despite the impressive
breadth of his reading in the pantheist tradition, McFarland has missed some
important texts of Coleridge himself. First of all, he has not .used-except for
the few pages in the appendix of James Boulger's Coleridge as Religious Thinkerthe numerous as yet unpublished later notebooks (after 1808), and has thus cut
himself off from a vast mine of Coleridge's important later ideas. More importantly, he has not used the large remnants of the" Opus Maximum" manuscript
-the three vellum-bound volumes in the Victoria College Library in Toronto
and the separated chapter on the Divine Ideas in the Huntington Library. It
is in this unpublished material-and, I believe, only there-that Coleridge was able
to focus at all clearly his speculations on the T rWry, on the Logos as the pattern
of Creation, and therefore on the metaphysical relationship between God and the
created world.
Let there be no mistake; McFarland's book is useful indeed. If it is flawed in
its conclusions, it remains incomparably rich in its exposition of the pantheist
influences on Coleridge's thought.
J. ROBERT BARTH, S. J.
Harvard University
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Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire by J. Hillis Miller. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Ptess, 1970. Pp. xvi + 282.
$6.95.

Hillis Miller's new book on Hardy has the same kinds of strengths and weaknesses his first four distingui~hed books have. Its ideas are expansive, leading us
toward new areas of critical thought,. and opening doors where before there
seemed none. Sometimes, however, the surer sense of Hardy is sacrificed to the
needs of the large ideas, and the abstracting, theorizing critical mind loses its
sympathy with the literature. When Miller's sympathetic understanding failsor is not engaged-he ·seems to miss the tone of the works, to miss the sense of
Hardy's art.
Perhaps this weakness comes from Miller's habit-followed now through Charles
Dickens:-the World of His Novels, The Disappearance of God, Poets of ~eality,
and The Form of Victorian Fiction-of building his arguments on phrases clipped
from the text before him, and used without reference to their context. _Obviously,
this technique is in part what enables Miller to range through an author's worb
as he'does. He offers a.defense in his preface to the Hardy book-"By detaching
a passage from its contiguous web of language, however, I have hoped to be able
to show its deeper affinities to passages in other works "-but the defense does
not justify, or satisfy.
Miller's thesis is that Hardy sees man caught in a "foolish' pursuit of happiness,"
a futile "infatuation II with -love, or being in love. Miller describes this way of
life as focused "in absorbed attention toward the future." This future is, of
course, a dreamj and rather than the self "transfigured," he says, what Hardy's
people achieve is disillusionment, frustration, defeat. U The detachment given by
falling out of love gives me enough distance from my life so that T can see it
as whole," and in this begins "a change in orientation from future to present
to past," which lets man see his "fated II failure.
Miller describes Tess as travelling" a determined course through life toward
her fated end," and then explains:
Hardy's concept of fate is neither that of some all-powerful transcendent force, malign or benign, consciously manipulating the lives of
its puppets, nor is. it like Faulkner's notion of some single catastrophic
event after which life is doomed to follow a certain sequence to its end.
Each man for Hardy remains free until his death, but when the moment
of retrospective illumination comes he sees that he has all along been the
victim of an unconscious power which has used his free acts as part of
the irresistible forward movement which hurries him on, keeping him
from fulfilling his intentions and from attaining any desirable life.
"Hardy's image of the total working of the Immanent Will," 'for Miller, is that
of "a complex web of causes interacting simultaneously," of II a chain of smaU
causes, each effect becoming a cause in its turn . . . . The whole forms a linear
sequence which is the course of a life." He calls this" an unintentional fate "_
an unhelpful phrasel-which leads men" inevitably toward an ignominious death,"
"for all is fated to happen as it does happen." Men's lives "have had their
meaning not in relation to the willed design they have tried to impose on it
[sic], but in relation to •.. a force working within their lives which alienates
them from themselves."
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The~e are ~wo ,problems with this definition of fate. One

is its turgidity. The
other 15 that It mIsses, finally, the tone of Hardy's voice and the sense of his art.
Miller describes brilliantly and persuasively the movement in Hardy's novels from
passionate subjectivity-the willfulness of Jude, Tess, Henchard-to an objective,
detached consciousness of what has been. But Miller reads this objectivity pessimistically, and the consciousness becomes the consciousness of a "predetennined"
fate. He chooses "It is as it should be" as Tess's last words, and explains that
she is now aware that she has done what she was forced to do in life; whereas
"I am ready" is actually Tess's last recorded sentence, and the whole scene
and the speech seem to indicate, tonally, an almost mystically transcendent awareness on Tess's part. She is It free" now-freed through her consciousness-and
her "Fulfillment." is more than simply ironic.
Miller argues that Hardy's characters are released in death from II the weight of
life, of consciousness, of individuality, the weight of time." A few pages later
he says that in death man is II freed from limitation, freed from anxiety, freed
from all narrowness and blindness, [but] nevertheless not freed from consciousness." But" death" is not the point, whether or not it frees one from conscious~
nesSj the meaning of life is what Hardy's vision is about. It is a tragic visionbut tragedy is not pessimistic, as Miller knows from Shakespeare and from Yeats.
Insisting, however, on this black version of existence, Miller has Hardy's
characters reach at "the end of their lives . . . a moment when they see with
approximate clarity that they have been deluded puppets of an alienating fotce."
Thus he has Hardy'S narrator call Henchard U Cain"-it is in fact Henchard
who calls himself that-and ignores Henchard's earlier awareness that his fate
is not merely blindly assigned suffering, but" what he had deserved." Thus Miller
chooses to focus his attention on Eustacia in The Return of the Native, and to
accept her adolescent self-indulgence-" I have been injured and blighted and
crushed by things beyond my control," etc.-as awareness ~'that the cause of
[her] suffering has been external to [her] conscious intent," rather than measure
her life according to Hardy's moral scheme of cause and effect, or look at the
positive consciousness Clym achieves at· the end of the novel, and the use to
which he puts this large awareness. Rather than see Tess's and Jude's ends as
tragic, and achieving the dignity of tragedy, Miller sees them as cheaply" fated."
Death is not the death of the hero who knows-and accepts-his responsibilitieS,
but the It ignominious death" of the victim whose only knowledge is that he
has lived a meaningless life in a meaningless world.
Miller collects numerous and varied evidences to support his argument, and one
is impressed by his comprehensive and agile familiarity with Hardy's works and
his life. Finally, however, the argument from the life to the works is gravely
distorting and distorted, and there are too many times when Miller's methodhabit-of quoting out of context lets him misuse his evidence or simply make
mistakes with it. Early, he quotes the first stanza of "Nature's Questioning" as
evidence of Hardy'S withdrawn and separate attitude toward lifej but he neglects
the last stanza of the poem, which corrects and reverses this. Similarly, he cites
U. To an Unborn Pauper Child" as Hardy's argument that "best of all would be
not to be born at all "-again forgetting the final stanza of the poem. He uses
the title of U God's Funeral" with similar disregard for the poem itself.
There are other, more serious errors. Miller uses as though they were the
narrator's comment two lines spoken by Angel Clare concerning the reason Tess
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has murdered Alec; the evidence with which he makes his point is false. In
arguing that Tess,' like Henchard and Jude, would like to blot out her life at
its "end, to "have [her] life uobe," Miller citeS the poem "Tess's Lament"but fails to record· that the novel gives us nothing of this feeling at all. Indeed,
Tess's last words to Angel gh:e us exactly the opposite sense. In ~ommenting
on the end of The Mayor oJ Casterbridge Miller selects from what the narrator
says con~erning Elizabeth-Jane so as to make her one who "expects little from
life," ·whose "stoic detachment ... renders her unwilling or unable to take full
advantage of the opportunities for happiness which she now has." This 'is not
Hardy's conclusion to the novel, but Miller's; and a full quotation of the last
tWo sentences would make this clear. In alleging Henchard's pessimistic r~signa
tion at the end, Miller has him "understanding that happiness is 'but the occasional episode in the genera~ drama of pain,' and seeing that in "an unjust universe
no 'human heing deserved less· than was given' "-whereas these lines actually
have nothing to do with Henchard, but are the narrator's description of how life
once seemed to Elizabeth-Jane. The words are borrowed from that final sentence
-selected, again, 'with a bias toward pessimism. In The Return of the Native,
in an· attempt to invalidate the rest of the novel after Eustacia's death, Miller
argues for the unw~itten pessimistic version of the story's tying up which would
have Diggory Venn disappear rather than marry Thomasin. He makes it seem
~at Hardy had speculated on making this the conclusion of the novel-which
is not the case.: The conclusion was written as it is written, with Clym standing
atop Ralnbarrow. The much-discussed footnote about Diggory and Thomasin
is at the end of the pep-ultimate chapter, not "a ghostly footnote on the last
page," as Miller alleges ..
THese complaints are, of course, serious matters. A critic as good as Miller
should not be so careless with his texts, or so easy on his own ideas. One wonders,
at the end of the book, if Miller's conclusions-Hardy's withdrawal from life,
his· idea of the separated consciousness, his sense of Hardy's fatalism and his
characters' "fatefullness "-would not change, slighdy, if Miller read his texts
more carefully, arid more in sympathy with their sense than with the ideas which
ca.n be abstracted and organized from them. One would hope so-for Miller's
earlier work marks him as one of the finest and most sensitive of critics of our
modern literature.
.
BERT

G.

HORNBACK

University of Michigan

The. Barb of Time: On the Unity of Ezra Pound's Cantos by Daniel D. Pearlman. New York: Oxford University· Press, 1969. Pp. x+ 318. $8.50.
Ezra Pound: The Image and the Real by Herbert N. Schneidau. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969, Pp. viii + 210. $5.95.
Daniel D. Pearlman has' made a major contribution to Pound studies by demonstrating that the parts of The £;antos " cohere in. a pattern of cumulative thematic
development." The developing theme is time: all the poem's su~-themes "interrelate and reveal their full significance in the light only of the single unifying
major theme of time." Previously, as Mr. Pearlman notes, there have been those
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who attempted to conceive of the poem as a whole, whom he calls integrative
critics; but these did not point out the pattern of development which he considers an indispensable feature of a major epic poem. In any case, many critics
of the poem, designating it this or that kind of majestic failure, have given up
the attempt to see it whole and have tended merely to appreciate one part or
another, swimming back to the wreck, as it were, only to salvage the ship's
biscuits or the carpenter's tools.
The developing theme that imposes the major form in Mr. Pearlman's reading
is the conflict between historical, linear time, which is inimical to the human
spirit, and cyclic Of organic time, in which the spirit thrives and is renewed.
Associated with the former are false abstractions, usury, bad art, social tyranny,
and disorder; associated with the latter are precise terminology, economic justice,
good art, individual freedom, and social order. The Cantos has three major
phases: in the first, linear time is predominant, and the confusion and decay of
western history are reflected. Nature is controlled by man. In the second, nature
becomes the model for the ordering of self and society, and its mode of operation
is organic time: "From Cantos 31 through 71 Pound uses segments of history
. . . to show that only those men and societies governed by a reverence for
organic time have the inner strength to resist the destructive efforts of those
who live by mechanical time." In the third phase, the Pisan Cantos, organic
time is seen to be the "universal expression of suprarational benevolent love."
Of anyone submitting such a formal scheme for the Cantos one wants to ask,
How conscious was Pound, has Pound been, of his own controlling structure?
One has in mind in particular the place in the whole poem of the Pisan Cantos,
where the accidents of his own biography have most marvellously become an
integral part. Pearlman investigates the matter of intentions carefully, citing the
places where Pound speaks of the project. Then he says, "A profound intuition,
I believe, gave Pound a sense of the whole from the very start." Later, he adds,
"One almost feels that if they had not actually happened to him, Pound's
experiences in a prison stockade would have had to be invented for the sake of
the major Jormal demands of the poem."
As he proceeds with his thesis, Mr. Pearlman studies certain cantos in detail,
and these parts of the book are full of original insights: one is amazed at some
of the perceptions of this critic: a Daniel come to judgment indeed! But it is
in the presentation of the major form that he provides the most revealing light
that has yet been shed upon The Cantos and goes beyond his predecessors in
this field, even such distinguished ones as Hugh Kenner and Donald Davie.
Speaking of the anti-novel, Frank Kermode has said that H Even when there
is a profession of complete narrative anarchy, as ... in a poem such as Paterson,
which rejects as spurious whatever most of us understand as form, it seems that
time will always reveal some congruence with a paradigm-provided always
that there is in the work that necessary element of the customary, which enables
it to communicate at alL" 1 So now some such congruence is found in the
Cantos. It is a question whether paradigms will be found for all poems, long or
short, especially such recent work as seems to make a point of its irreverence
1

The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 129.
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for the western virtues of rationalism, abstraction, and order, in its search for the

purity of the concrete, its effort (with the impact of Zen) to submit truth· as
revelation of being, its war against interpretation, and its aim to become itself
a brave new world full of scattered bright things. Herbert N. Schneidau, for
his part, believes that the Cantor belongs to this kind: he guards against taking
literally some of the expressed hopes of Pound that the form would appear in
time, and indeed he believes that the very precision in the etching of the details
in the poem "prevents them from being subordinated to any unifying principle
. . ," With its massive texture now subdued to order in Mr. Pearlman's reading,
on the other hand, the poem becomes not an exhibit in this modem -trend hut
a commentary upon it, a commentary that opposes and prefers a primitive notion

of time to the western linear sense. And we shall surely see more, much more,
of exhibit and commentary both, partly as an implicit or explicit questioning
of the western mind and the phantasmagoria it has bequeathed us since, somewhat
by chance and somewhat by the momentum of Plato and his "shift out of being
into consideration," II Europe took the direction of rationalism, science and tech-

nology, which last has brought us what it has brought.
Mr. Schneidau's main interest is not in the Cantos but in Pound's poetics.
He has studied-sometimes scrutinized-the letters, essays, and miscellaneous
writings, Pound's and others', and is enabled thus to identify precisely the
meanings of such terms as imagism, vorticism, logopoeia, and others. For one
instance, he demonstrates that imagism was primarily a matter of discipline, taking

its character from the qualities of good prose under the tutelage of Ford Madox
H ueffer; it had no necessary, exclusive relation to the visual image. This was
Hulme's thing, and Mr. Schneidau carefully sorts out Pound's relationship to

Hulme in the growth of the imagist poetic and describes the minimal influence
of the latter.
These statements and others are an carefully and thoroughly argued, and the
reader is indebted throughout the book for the clarification of many various issues.
Mr. Schneidau occasionally corrects the pronouncements of predecessors with a
little undue verve: the critics who came before him generalized in these matters,

as men do and should, before they could safely generalize; and it is obvious that
they are vulnerable to the masters of nuance and scruple whose way they have

prepared. But this is not by any means to suggest that Mr. Schneidau takes a
narrow approach; certainly not:. the discussions repeatedly open up into broad
considerations-the concrete universal. incarnation, epiphany, typology, and the

old debate between realism and nominalism. The book has value bey~nd that
derived from the more local issues which it definitely and very usefully settles.

A. K.

WEATHERHEAD

University of Oregon

11 The trend of modem American poetry away from rationalism et cetera, is
discussed by Ray Benoit in "The New American Poetry," Thought, 44 (June,
19(9), 201-18.
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Form and Frenzy in Swift's Tale of a Tub by John R. Clark. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1970. Pp. xvi + 237. $8.00.
Twentieth-century approaches to Swift's Tale of a Tub can be tentatively
divided into several categories. There is the time-honored extrinsic approach
which investigates source and tradition, as in the series of articles by Clarence
Webster in the early 1930's. Another valid extrinsic approach is the study of
intellectual background, as in Phillip Harth's thorough Swift and Anglican
Rationalism: The Religious Background of A Tale of a Tub (Chicago, 1961).
There are also several approaches which combine the extrinsic and intrinsic, the
most ancient of these being biographical criticism, as in Emile Pons' famous
Swift: Les Annies de Jeunnesse et Ie" Conte du. Tonneml" (Paris, 1925). Closely
related to the biographical critic is the one who, though not strictly a psychologist,
manages to psychologize a great deal, as in R. E. Hughes' "The Five Fools in
A Tale of a Tu.b," Literature and Psychology, XI (1961). Or one may combine
the extrinsic and intrinsic by using a comparative approach, as in J. A. Levine's
II The Design of A Tale of a Tub (With a Digression on a Mad Modem Critic),"
ELH, XXXIII (1966), which aligns Swift's piece with Nahokov's Pale Fire.
The intrinsic critics may be divided into two groups: those who study A Talc
of a Tub as rhetoric and those who study it as satire. Among those who have
distinguished themselves as rhetorical critics are Rohert C. Elliott (" Swift's Tale
of a Tub: An Essay in Problems of Structure," PMLA, LXVI, 1951) and Martin
Price (Swift's Rhetorical Art, New Haven, 1953). Two of the better students
of the Tale's satire are John M. Bullitt (Jonatban Swift and tbe Anatomy of
Satire, Cambridge, Mass., 1953) and Edward Rosenheim, Jr, (Swift and tbe
Satirist's Art, Chicago, 1963).
Still another approach to A Tale of A Tub, one which would be somewhat
mislabeled if we were to call it either intrinsic or extrinsic, is the study of studiesi. e., surveys and analyses of trends in Swift criticism. Such an approach is very
useful when the critical and scholarly issues are as intricate and controversial
as those surrounding the Tale. Two scholars who have been of great senrice here
arc Milton Voigt (Swift and tbe Twentietb Ce17wry, Detroit, 1964) and the
" Dean" of Swift critics, Ricardo Quintana (" Emile Pons and the Modern Srudy
of Swift's Tale of a Tub," Etudes Ang/aises, XVIII, 1965).
It has been necessary to sketch the several categories of criticism in order to
set the scene for the entrance of John R. Clarl{'s Form and Frenzy in S'U,jft's Tale
of a Tub-not that it fits into anyone of these categories: on the contrary, it
belongs to all of them. In spite of Clark's assertions that his purpose is merely
"to examine the Tale of a Tub as a work of art," that he wishes to approach
the Tale" centripetally" (p. 5), Form and Fre17zy is much more than an ordinary
"close reading." It is a study of the long tradition of I~ Fools and Knaves" on
which Swift drew (Chapter 1); it is an analysis of the intellectual background
of the ancient-modern quarrel (Chapter III) j it uses biographic:ll criticism to
separ:ltc Swift from his persona (Chapter 1); it psychologizes in the chapter
entitled "The Decorum of i\fodern Madness"; it is occasionally comparative,
as in the effortS to align Swift with Aldous Huxley and Nathaniel ,,\Vest (p, 85);
it is a sustained asscssment of the Tale's rhetoric, e"en thoUlzh Clark at the outset
Yigorousl)' rejects the rhetorical approach (pp, 3-13); it is ~a useful guide to the
work's satirical strategies; and it is, lastly, a srudy of studies, for scarcely any
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earlier Swifcians escape mention and evaluation. Form and Frenzy is probably
one of the busiest books ever written about a literary work, as though Clark
had been inspired (or seduced?) by the contagious energies of the Tale itself.
The wonder is that .everything Clark does, he does well; the reader comes away
sigIlally more informed and enthused about Swift than before.
Because C.lark's logic is sturdy, to disagree with him is not so much to argue
with 'his local insights as to question the fundamental assumptions on which his
logic rests. And pecause these, assumptions are received standard opinion in
recent criticism, one hesitates to go against the tide. Even 50, this reviewer feels
it' ne'cessary to offer two objections.
In the first place, Clark, like too many modern critics, overemphasizes unity.
As a Chicago-School Nco-Aristotelian he is committed to the doctrine that
masterpieces are always made coherent by certain consistent principles and that
to discover these principles is t9 discern what makes the work of art successful.
Accordingly, Form tmd Frenzy contains a number of proclamations like this:

book
tome
i,l"l

Yet let it be said-emphatically-that the Tale's content should reveal an
internal artistic continuity transcending any mere catering to the opinions
of William Temple, any mere opportunism or artistic helplessness, or any
particular instances of cantankerous ad hominem name-calling. If the
.Tale of a Tub is to reveal itself as a coherent work of art, then the
ancients-and-moderns controversy of thc: 1690's in England must be'
understood as the work's occasion only, not as the work's tyrannous
cause. (pp. 95-96)

in S,

The dangers attending such a critical attitude may be phrased as rhetorical questions. What, after all. is so sacred about unity? And is it not possible that this
"unity" often' resides not in the work but in the mind of the critic? Would
it not 'be more accurate-and more refreshing-to argue, as in Morse Peckham's
Man's "Rage for Chaos (Philadelphia, 1965), that what fascinates us in. an is
lIot its consistency and order, not its routineness, but rather its swerving surprises
and' instabilities; not its themes but rather its variations on those themes? An
acknowledgement of the volatile vagaries of art is especially pertinent to the
study of satire, which is usually a random and hodgepodge kind of composition,
as the derivation of the word suggests (" satura," or a mixed dish). And to drive
it'into a neat pattern, as Clark tries to do, is to go against the dominant spirit of
the satiric tradition, a ·spirit that for centuries has sought such loose forms as the
familiar epistle, the picaresque tale, the anatomy, or the confession, all of which
are exploited in the profound and dazzling laxity "of Swift's Tale. (One might
remind- himself that the Tale is literally unfinished, which would seem to call its
unity into question.)
, A second major 'assumption underlying Form and Frenzy is the ·belief in the
device of the persona. Students of satire feel an urgency here, for to equate
the speaker with the satirist is often to suggest that the author himself was nasty,
irrational, and perhaps even insane. Thus the doctrine of the persona is frequently
employed as a means of whitewashing the writer: Swift, some recent critics have
maintained, was' not really fascinated with excrement; rather, we are told, he
was .merely scoffing' at others for being fascinated with man's lower regions.
Though Clark is less naive in his glossings, he' is still too' eager to clear Swift of
even ·the most trivhil charge. Thus the portrait that emerges out of Clark's
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book is of a wise and honorable Swift, pure in his motives and totally opposed
to the foul and foolish Modern who is the narrator of the Tale. Form and Frenzy
is largely the product of the great reaction against the Victorian image of Swift
as a hideous misanthrope; but in H resurrecting" him recent criticism may have
swung too far in the other direction, trading one simplism off for another. The
truth would seem to lie somewhere between: Swift, like a number of major
writers, was a man who articulated great thoughts and feelings but who also had
a broad streak of eccentric nastiness. The so-called "persona" of the Tale is
probably the author himself, broadly seen in onc of those stances which reveals
the gleeful dark backside of the mind, the anti-self that refuses to be suppressed.
That the mask is the man has been suggested by Irvin Ehrenpreis (" Personae,"
in Restoration and Eighteenth-Century Literature, Chicago, 1963); but Clark
relegates Ehrenpreis to a footnote (p. 153) and proceeds to argue the question
of how many personae exist in the Tale, begging the more basic question of
whether there is such a thing as a persona.
One may conclude, then, that John R. Clark's well-written Form and Frenzy
in Swift's Tale of a Tub is as excellent as its assumptions permit it to be.
PETER THORPE

University of Colorado, Denver

The Birth of Modern Comedy in Renaissance Italy by Douglas Radcliff-Umstead.
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. ix+ 285.
$12.50.

What is especially disappointing about Mr. Radcliff-Umstead's study is its
failure to approach the promise of its title. What the author means by " modem,"
it turns out, is whatever appears in Renaissance Italian comedy that is not to be
attributed to the practice of Plautus and Terence upon which it is based. The
book's failure to place Renaissance Italian comedy somewhere in the spectrum
between Aristophanes and Jonson or Moliere or Goldoni or Pirandello or Shaw
or whomever would not be so disappointing if the author had delivered a helpful
synthesis or new perspective for what did takc place in the comic thcater of
the period he deals with. The reader has a difficult time piecing together what
it was exactly that got born in the Latin humanistic comedy of the trecento and
quattrocento and the vernacular c01111J1edia erudita of the first half of the
dnquecento.
Radcliff-Umstead's approach is to survey selected plays and show mainly in
each case how a work reflected on the one hand the influence of Plautus and
Terence and how it reflected on the other hand Italian novelle or the mores and
conditions of Italian life. Thus here we have a typical Terentian character or
here a plot from Plautus-there we have a character or situation from Boccaccio
and there a scene drawn from Italian life. Here a play follows the theory of the
unities or the tightly organized intigue of Roman comedy-there an author defies
the unities or works more with character sketches and episodes than with intrigue.
There is helpful detail in the book. For example, the reader can discover how
in a play I.ike Ariosto's 1l Negromante the central character specifically reflects
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conceptions of magIcIans in the novelle, and how which plays of Terence
furnished models for a particular theme, situation, or character. Or for a play
like Nardi's La Commedia di A11licizia the reader learns which novella of Boccaccio
was the chief source and how one scene was based on a typical episode of medieval
sacred drama. The author's review of Machiavelli's La Mandragola gives us the
various ingredients, its classical economy, the folk legends involved, the sources
and methods of characterization, the focus on contemporary environment, and
the II local texture."
Sometimes such details gather into whole impressions about a playwrightfor example, Aretina's variety of teclmiques and themes and range of characters,
or Bealco's love for the country setting, the folk tradition, the peasant character.
One can piece out well enough some rather obvious general points, for example
that Renaissance Italian comedy is peopled with Italians and concerned with
problems peculiar to the times, like corrupt churchmen and Spanish intruders.
And one catches in Radcliff-Umstead's review that the commedia erudita was
more erotic than Roman comedy, in its more expansive concern with both sensual
love and romantic love.
Yet the study fails over-all to gather its threads into a whole cloth. The
heterogeneous details of the Italian comedies of the period are presented just that
way-heterogeneously, and a significantly new conception about Italian comedy
or modern comedy fails to emerge. In his conclusion Radcliff-Umstead claims that
the Renaissance Italian playwrights created II a comic theater that helped determine
the course of modem European drama." Perhaps so. But the author does not
really tell us how so.
Roman comedy was a comedy of manners. Perhaps the commedia erudita was
simply a transfer of the Plaurine and Terentian idea of comedy to a new set of
manners. To show otherwise one perhaps needs to pursue the commedia erudita
on to the end of the sixteenth century, relating it along the way to the emerging
commedia dell' arte, but such is not the author's scope. Or perhaps one needs
to look for the germ of a comic idea that informs the comic art fonn of the
earlier period. To explain what comic idea there was in the novelle and how it
differed from that of Roman comedy might have been a helpful preliminary
approach that Radcliff-Umstead did not adopt.
The reader feels there is something in the comedy with which the author deals
that is germinal, something· the author hits upon Bint-like now and again, "something unchaste, irreligious, and definitely salacious," as he says generally in
speaking of the attraction the conrmedia erudita held for Elizabethan authors.
Perhaps something irreverent and reverent and absurd, we want to say, like
Machiavelli's irreverent he~o in La Mandragola, who overcomes society's rules
and achieves his erotic desires by invoking absurd myths about the power of a
mandrake potion to kill and to generate.
Susanne Langer said that II Comedy is an art fonn that arises naturally wherever
people are gathered to celebrate life, in spring festivals, triumphs, birthdays.
weddings, or initiations" (Feeling and Fonn, New York, 1953, p. 331) .. Wylie
Sypher defined comedy as II a Carrying Away of Death, a triumph over mortality
by some absurd faith in rebirth, restoration, and salvation" (Comedy, Garden
City, N.Y., 1956, p. 220). TheoristS like Langer, Sypher, Northrop Frye, and
others have looked to ritual for a conception of comedy that precedes and
infuses comedy as an art form. F. M. Cornford's The Origin of Attic Comedy
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(London, 1914) revealed such an infusion at one point in the history of comedy.
And we conjure Aristophanes and a play like Tbe Birds and understand the
ritual of irreverent reverence that informs the art-the rascal hero fleeing the
taxes, law courts, and other civilized nonsense of Athens, establishing a new
Olympus in the skies with the birds as divinities, ejecting false men and foolish
gods, and wedding himself to Sovereignty, the beautifully adorned Basileia.
Renaissance critics defined comedy as "an imitation of life, a mirror of custom,
an image of truth," a definition they got from the fourth-century Tercntian
commentator Donatus, who got it from Cicero. And we think, as the Renaissance
theorists did, of the plays of PlaUtllS and Terence where typically a young hero
with the help of a clever servant managed his way through a society of foolish
fathers, braggart soldiers, misers, sober matrons, courtesans, slave dealers, parasites,
and what have you, to achieve his youthful desires, sometimes irreverently, but not
very absurdly-and the hero seldom was allowed to disturb society very much, or
edge it from its dead center for very long, especially not so in Terence.
After the evolution of Aristophanic comedy into the "new" comedy of
Menander, Plautus, and Terence, comedy evolved again in association with the
folk festivals and sacred drama of medieval Christianity. The Renaissance humanists looked back to the Roman comedy of manners for a form for a comic art,
the Italians the first to do so. What the reader might expect, or hope for, from
a book with the title that Radcliff-Umstead gives his is an understanding of a
new synthesis, an understanding of some comic idea that took hold when an old
comic form of manners was imposed as successor of whatever comic traditions
developed in medieval ritual, festival, and story.
But the author does not approach his material .vith such a perspective, or with
any other perspective that gives us any clear notion of .vhat did get born in
Italian Renaissance comedy. We arc left with a notion that here was a comic
theater that was somehow "vhal" and "modern" in its assimilation of Roman
comedy, the novelle, and Italian life-and a few other things that appear here
and there, like some folklore, some echoes of the mere rappresemflziani, and some
sense and spirit of carnival. Perhaps that's all that can be said for this Italian
comedy, that it was a new version of an old comedy of manners, with bits and
pieces of other things-and that a "modern" comedy never got born here at a11maybe that happened in some other time, and some other place.
JAMES

E. ROBINSON

Ullivasity of N atre Dame
D. H. Lav.rrence and tbe New TVarld by Dayid Cavitch. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969. Pp. x -I- 232. $6.00.
This book sets out to examine Lawrence's conception of a new world but
turns out to be an attack on his integrity as a writer. Cavitch's conclusion that
Lawrence was unable to face the truth abom his own pcrson~diry and therefore
falsified his art is a serious indicmlCl1t and one which ought not to go unchallenged.
The labyrinth of the critic's argument nms from Lawrcnce'.<; earliest noycls to the
final poems. At times the evidence is plausible, at other times tOO far-fetched to
be taken seriously~in the end it brcal.;s dO'\\'n under the weight of Lawrence's
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own pronouncements, many of which are quoted at length. The book simply
does not prove that Lawrence's "creative self was so closely bound to his image
of woman that he needed constantly to defend the genius of himself against the
conscious shame of effeminacy (p. 29), nor does Cavitch establish that the" unsatistied need for masculine identification enters all of Lawrence's works 11 (p. 30).
The attempt to reduce to a single proposition the complex being and artist that
was Lawrence by trying to find a simplified psychoanalytic explanation for the
well spring of his art results in a welter of questionable critical exegesis and
biographical speculation.
There is a sensational overtone in this book as well. Cavitch discovers latent
homosexual tendencies in Lawrence. There is that wrestling scene in Women in
Love, and later the nursing of Rawdon Lilly by Aaron Sisson; there is Lawrence's
encounter with Maurice Magnus. The conclusion is that in America Lawrence
learned the awful truth about himself, and his subsequent work became an
evasion of reality. According to Cavitch, Lawrence "wrote himself into a state
of utter withdrawal from a commonly experienced world" (pp. 107-8) and" in
his works records his progressive devaluing of outer reality and his venturing
away into psychological isolation" (p. 108). While pretending to search for an
ideal society, Lawrence was in fact running away from his" sexual ambivalence"
(p. 150), and his "lofty quest for a freer world where men can share eternal,
unisexual love, ends in America; for he came to recognize that his idealization of
manly love was a symptom of his lack of masculine identification" (pp. 150-51).
Cavitch is bent on seeing Lawrence's writing as motivated by a suppressed
homoeroticism. Thus, Gudrun, in Women in Love, is a character to whom
Lawrence transfers U the feelings that would have been Birkin's if his homosexuality had become explicitly the central issue in the fiction" (p. 67). Such
a reading of Women in Love ignores the complexity of Lawrence's view in that
novel, and the emphasis on the homoerotic element leads the critic to misread
Lawrence's prescription for an ideal society. By taking out of context Lawrence's
ideas on the necessity of "manly love," the need for some sort of Blutbruderschaft,
Cavitch overlooks Lawrence's other requirements for a new era. It is Lawrence
who writes: II And upon what is this new era established? On the perfect circuits
of vital flow between human beings. First, the great sexless normal relation
between the individuals, simple sexless friendships, unison of family, and clan,
and nation, and group. Next, the powerful sex relation between man and woman,
culminating in the eternal orbit of marriage. And, finally, the sheer friendship,
the love of comrades, the manly love which alone can create a new era of life"
(p. 98). Although Cavitch quotes this passage, he apparently fails to grasp its
meaning, for he argues that the only important relationship for creating "the
new world" is some sort of homoerotic relationship between men. The shape
of Lawrence's "new world" is indeed a worthy subject for a new study of
Lawrencej the excursion to America and the search there for some remaining
thread of a new society needs to be explored by those who want to understand
Lawrencej but a fruitless attempt to reveal in Lawrence a subconscious fear of
homosexuality will not define the shape of the "new world. u
When Lawrence collapsed, after finishing the novel The Plumed Serpent, it
was the imminent prospect of death which forcefully impressed upon him that
life is much too precious to be squandered. It was not, as Cavitch would have
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it, that "he no longer experienced feelings of sexual desire for either women
or men, but that his libido was latent and narcissistic" (p. 189); nor was it that
he decided to throw" off his burden of sex" (p. 190). He decided that there
was no morc point in preaching to others about sex, or about anything else. As
he says of Gethin Day, "the sheer joy of life," the" marvellous joy of life" here
'was the important thing, and it "is a beauteous thing to live and to be alive,"
for it "is the Deed of life we have now to learn."
Yet it would be unfair to say that Lawrence learned this lesson so late in lifehis reverence for life in the flesh is the quality which very early set him apart
from other writers. Although the collapse in America reinforced his former
sense of values, he could not remain long without preaching. Cavitch would
have it that he turned to "idyll and romance," that in Lady Chatterley's Lover,
Lawrence's" attack against modern culture is only superficial" (p. 198). The
reading of Lady Chatterley's Lover as a work in which" Mellors has unchecked
possession of Connie's body which he adroitly and hostilely uses" (p. 201), in
which there is "no reverence for individual being" is too distorted to merit
consideration. This novel, which was once called Tenderness, is Lawrence's
supreme attempt to find a small measure of human joy in an otherwise joyless
world. As for The Man Who Died, it is more accurate to say that in the story
Lawrence renounces his own mission. He realizes that all forms of compulsion are
evil, even those that would have people love one another.
Once, he had aptly compared himself to Carlyle who wrote fifty volumes on
the value of silence. For one who would have men and women behave spontaneously and respond to the rhythms of their natural beings, Lawrence no longer
felt the" need to force the mind or the soul in any direction" (p. 209). Having
always, as he says, laboured at the same thing, co to make the sex relation valid
and precious, instead of shameful," in his later work Lawrence was certainly
not escaping into "idyll and romance." Even Cavitch admits that "Lawrence's
best art considers the plight of human individuality in an immensely powerful,
obscure universe" (p. 217). And Mellors and Connie, as Lawrence shows, must
cherish that small bit of tenderness which they have managed to redeem from a
world which constantly threatens "to overwhelm and extinguish the small, true
flame of real loving communion" which alone can save them. Far from the
"detached narcissism" which Cavitch sees, Lawrence's later fiction shows us a
writer who pursued to the end his early commitment to bringing about a change
inside the individual which, as a novelist, was his real concern.
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